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THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
By John L. Hall, of the Suffolk Bar.
Upon April 22d, i9o8, there was enacted by Congress what has
been known as the "Employers' Liability Act" and described un-
der the title, "An Act Relating to the Liability of Common Car-
riers by Railroad to Their Employees in Certain Cases." The
first section of that Act is as follows:
"That every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in
commerce between any of the several states or territories or be-
tween any of the states and territories or between the District of
Columbia and any of the states or territories and any foreign
nation or nations shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce,
or in case of the death of such employee to his or her personal
representative for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband
and children of such employee, and if none, then of such em-
ployee's parents, and if none, then of the next of kin dependent
upon such employee for such injury or death resulting in whole
or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or
employees of such carrier or by reason of any defect or insuffi-
ciency due to its negligence in its cars, engines, appliances, ma-
chinery, tracks, roadbed, works, boats, wharves or other equip-
ment."
By section 3 it is provided:
"That in all actions hereafter brought against any such com-
mon carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the pro-
visions of this Act to recover damages for personal injuries to
an employee or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the
fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be di-
minished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence at-
tributable to such employee, provided that no such employee who
may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such
common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees
contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
The only case in New England known to the writer which has
arisen under the provisions of this Act and which has been sub-
mitted to a jury is that of Mary A. Walsh, Admx., against the
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co., recently tried in
the Federal court for the district of Massachusetts. The plain-
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tiff's intestate was a car inspector and while beneath a car in
the course of his employment received injuries resulting in his
death, due to the alleged negligence of a fellow workman in per-
mitting certain other cars to be brought in contact with the car un-
der which the deceased was at work. While the facts are in dis-
pute, the jury found for the plaintiff in a substantial amount. The
presiding judge declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the
Act, and his instructions to the jury were as follows:
"If you find, then, having found that the defendant company
was a common carrier and engaged in interstate commerce, that
the plaintiff's intestate was injured, and also while employed by
such carrier engaged in such commerce, died as a result in whole
or in part of negligence of the employees of the defendant, and if
you find that the plaintiff met his burden of showing that, and if
you find that the defendant has not met his burden of showing
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff's intestate, or
if you find that he has met the burden .of showing that there
was contributory negligence, then the negligence of the. defendant
company should be reduced by the negligence attributable to the
plaintiff's intestate and if that reduction does not take away the
entire amount of the verdict which you find proper for the
plaintiff on account of the negligence of the defendant company's
employees, then you will fix the question of damages under rules
which I will give.
"The measure of damages is compensation for the pecuniary
loss sustained by the widow and children of the plaintiff's intes-
tate; the amount to be recovered is judged by his character,
earning capacity, his habits and morals, and his cares and bt-
tentions and solicitude for his children. It is for you to pass
upon this question-what was the life of the plaintiff's intestate
worth to the widow and children under such fair and reason-
able rules as can be given and in the consideration of reasonable
men? How long would he live? What was he earning? What
was the cost of living? What was he worth to the widow and
children?"
The reference to the trial of this case is intended to illustrate
concretely the practical working of the Act and to suggest to the
mind of the lawyer the question of how the Act can promote the
flow of commerce between the states.
The title of the Act relates to the liability of the carrier to
its employees. It is, in fact, the regulation of the liability of the
master to the servant. It primarily gives to the employee the
rights against the employer which he has not hithertofore pos-
sessed. It is supposedly based upon the law of torts. Recovery
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may be bad by reason of the negligence of any officer or agent of
employee of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce. Recov-
ery may be had also for any defect in the ways, works or ma-
chinery which is due to the negligence of the carrier. The ordi-
nary risks which an employee takes of the negligence of a fel-
low employee may not now be relied upon by the carrier.
By the provisions of section 3 no lack of care on the part of the
employee shall totally defeat his dction, and by section 5 of the
Act, the carrier cannot by any contract or rule exempt itself from
any liability created under the Act. Its plain purport is to regu-
late the relations of the carrier in its position as employer with
its employees. In effect, it determines the conditions of em-
ployihent which shall obtain between the interstate carrier and its
employees. It gives to the employees new rights; it takes away
from the employers defenses which have existed under the com-
mon law. It is not based upon the principle that there shall be a
remedy for a wrong committeed; it is not justified .on the ground
of the existence of great dangers in the employment regulated,
because its provisions apply not only to those who are actually
engaged in train service, but to employees whose duties are purely
clerical and who have no connection with the movement or oper-
ation of trains. It is in its essence an act of taxation.
The enactment of such a regulation can only arise from the
power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several
states. What, then, is the test for determining whether an Act
of Congress is a regulation of commerce within'the broad mean-
ing of the Constitution?
In Hopkins v. United States,1 the language of the court is as
follows:
"To treat as condemned by the Act all agreements under which,
as a result, the cost of conducting an interstate commercial busi-
ness may be increased would enlarge the application of the Act
far beyond the fair meaning of the language used. There must
be some direct and immediate effect upon interstate commerce in
order to come within the Act."
In Addyston P. & S. Co. v. United States,2 the court said:
"Under this -grant of power to Congress that body in our
judgment may enact such legislation as shall declare void and
prohibit the performance of any contract between individuals or
corporations where the natural and direct effect of such a con-
1 171 U. S., 592.
2175 U. S., 228.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
tract will be when carried out to directly, and not as a mere inci-
dent to. other and innocent purposes, regulate to any substantial
extent interstate commerce."
And in the same decision this language is used:
"And that the power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce comprises the right to enact a law prohibiting the citizenfrom entering into those private contracts which directly and sub-
stantially and not merely indirectly record incidentally and col-laterally regulate to a greater or less degree commerce among
the states."
And upon page 234:
"Where the contract affects interstate commerce only incident-
ally and not directly, the fact that it was not designed or intended
to affect such commerce is simply an additional reason for hold-
ing the contract valid and not touched by the Act of Congress."
In Adair v. United States, it is said:
"Manifestly, any rule prescribed for the coriduct of interstate
commerce in order to be within the competency of Congress un-
der its power to regulate commerce among the states must have
some real or substantial- relation to or connection with the com-
merce regulated."
From this language it is plain that the purpose of the Consti-
tution was to secure a free and unobstructed flow of commerce
between the states comprising the Confederation. Does this Act
of Congress meet the tests required by the decisions of the Su-
preme Court? Do its provisions naturally and directly and logic-
ally tend to promote or facilitate commerce between the states?
Is it "to make easier or safer or speedier to transport freight or
carry passengers from one state to another"?
The argument that is advanced by those who seek to uphold the
constitutionality of the measure is based upon the fact that inas-
much as Congress has power to regulate interstate commerce, it
may well regulate all the instrumentalities connected with or con-
cerned in interstate commerce.
"An examination of them (decisions) will show that the regula-
tion of interstate commerce extends to the regulation of the
persons engaged in it. The engine, the train, the cars which move
commerce may be regulated by Congress. Why cannot Congress
regulate the relation between the interstate carrier and its inter-
state servants? No commerce can move without labor. How
8 208 U. S., 178.
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can Congress regulate commerce if it cannot 
impose rules of
liability upon those engaged in it?"
Argument of the Assistant Attorney-General 
of the United
States in Hoxie v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co.
4
Mr. Justice Moody, in Howard 
V. Illinois Central R. R.,
5 says:
"If Congress in the exercise of its plenary power over inter-
state and foreign transportation deems that 
the safety of that
transportation would be increased by enacting 
that those em-
ployed in it shall have a different remedy 
for injuries sustained
by its negligent conduct than that furnished 
by the laws of the
states, this court cannot without overstepping 
the boundary which
separates the judicial from the legislative field declare 
the enact-
ment void."
Again on page 526:
"How poor and meagre the power would be if, whenever it
was exercised, the legislator must pause 
to consider whether the
action proposed regulated commerce or 
merely regulated the
conduct of persons engaged in commerce."
Again on page 529:
"They (decisions) cannot be regarded 
lightly and if we fol-
low them they lead us to the conclusion that 
the national power to
regulate commerce is broad enough to 
regulate employment,
duties, obligations, liabilities and conduct 
of all persons engaged
in commerce with respect to all which 
is comprehended in that
commerce. . . . If the statute which is 
now before us is beyond
the constitutional power of Congress, surely 
the Safety Appli-
ance Act is also void, for there can be no 
distinction in principle
between them."
In other words, the arguments advanced 
proceed upon the
theory that Congress has power to regulate 
all those engaged in
interstate commerce rather than upon the 
theory that the Act must
be one which directly and naturally regulates 
interstate commerce.
That argument is unsound. An Act passed 
by Congress forbid-
ding employees engaged in interstate commerce 
to assign their
wages might well be a regulation of those 
engaged in interstate
commerce, yet such an Act could not be construed 
as a regulation
of interstate commerce itself. An Act of 
Congress might require
carriers engaged in interstate commerce to 
employ only those who
belonged to a labor organization, yet such 
an Act would not be a
473 AtI. Rep., 754.
5 207 U. S., 463.
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regulation of interstate commerce. Congress has already passed
an Act, making it criminal for an interstate carrier to discharge
an employee because of his membership in a labor organization.
Such an Act was a regulation of those engaged in interstate com-
merce, yet it was not a regulation of interstate commerce itself,
as construed by the Supreme Court in the case of Adair v. United
States.6
If such a doctrine as advanced by those supporting the consti-
tutionality of this measure was the law, there is no reason why
Congress might not so legislate in regard to the liabilities of ship-
pers engaged in interstate commerce toward their employees.
The answer to Mr. Justice Moody's question to justify the pas-
sage of the Safety Appliance Act is found in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan in the Adair case:
"That Act required carriers engaged in interstate commerce to
equip their cars used in such commerce with automatic couplers
and continuous brakes and their locomotives with driving wheel
brakes, but the Act upon its face showed that its object was to
promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads;
and this court sustained its validity upon the ground that it mani-
festly had reference to interstate commerce and was calculated
to subserve the interests of such commerce by affording protec-
tion to employees and travelers. It was held that there was a
substantial connection between the object sought to be attained
by the Act and the means provided to accomplish that object."
No such purport presents itself upon the face of the Act in
question. It does not declare in any respect that it regulates inter-
state commerce. It is an "Act to regulate the liability of carriers
to employees." Because it is a regulation of master and ser-
vant, it does not follow that it is beyond the authority of Con-
gress. It must be such a regulation that it directly and naturally
and logically prombtes or facilitates interstate commerce. It is
that imperative condition which must obtain before the Supreme
Court can declare that the Act is within the provisions of the Con-
stitution. Does the Act naturally and directly make the trans-
portation of freight or passengers easier from one state to an-
other? Does it naturally and directly make such transportation
safer? Did the legal relations between employer and employee,
as they existed prior to the passage of the Act, tend to obstruct
or prevent the free flow of commerce between the states? Did
they affect in any way the safe and speedy transportation of
8 208 U. S., 161.
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freight or passengers from one state to another? It is difficult to
see that this Act does in any degree increase the amount of com-
merce between the states or that the non-existence- of the Act
would tend to decrease the amount of commerce between the
states. It is difficult to see that trains carrying freight or passen-
gers will be moved with greater speed or with greater safety.
If it was the intention of Congress to pass an Act for the pur-
pose of securing the safety of passengers and property in inter-
state transportation, would not there have been some declaration
of such purpose by Congress itself? If safety of transportation
had been in the minds of Congress, would there have been a pro-
vision permitting an employee engaged in the movement of trains
to recover for injuries to which his own carelessness contributed?
Surely such a right of recovery is not an incentive to the safe
and careful handling of trains.
The safe and rapid carriage of passengers and freight is ac-
complished only by the exercise of a high degree of care by the
officers and men so engaged. Accidents are bound to occur; they
are incident to the operation of a railroad. Some arise from
causes which are really unforeseen and cannot be guarded against.
Some arise from a single act of carelessness-a momentary ab-
sence of attention. An engineer fails to notice his signal, a
brakeman fails to cover the rear of his train, a switch is misplaced,
a signal is not given, a mistake in orders, and the consequences to
human life and property are disastrous. No Act can be said to
promote the exercise of that high degree of care which is required
of railroad employees which permits compensation for the failure
to exercise such care.
It is only by an indirect and unsatisfactory method of rea-
soning that it can be said that safety in transportation is pro-
moted by increasing the amount of damages which a railroad com-
pany must pay for the acts of carelessness of its men in their
relations to each other. Indeed, under present conditions rail-
road employees are in a great measure a self-governing body,
their compensation, their obligations, the performance of their
duties in no small degree rest with themselves. It is important
that they themselves should feel that upon them rests the responsi-
bility of working with men whose conduct shall be as free as possi-
ble from negligence. Safety will not be promoted by lessening
their sense of responsibility in this respect.
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It has been said that Congress has attempted to use the power
of regulating commerce "as a pretext for legislation really intend-
ed for some other purpose"; that the measure is really for the pur-
pose of satisfying the labor vote of the country; that its real aimis not to regulate commerce, but to distribute the burden of in-juries resulting from the operation of railroads.
Certain members of the House Judiciary Committee of the Six-
tieth Congress reported as follows upon this bill:
"We are unable to see how interstate commerce can be im-peded, obstructed or hindered or facilitated, promoted or aidedeither directly or indirectly in the slightest degree in either casebecause the doctrine of fellow servants does or does not apply
as a matter of liability between the employer and the employee
engaged in interstate commerce."
The answer of Mr. Paine, the majority leader, was this:
"When the former bill was before the House, I said to thegentlemen around me that I feared it was unconstitutional, butit meets the approbation of the counsel for the locomotive engi-
neers and therefore I voted for it. I say to-day that I fear thisbill may receive the same decision from the Supreme Court ofthe United States when it gets there, but I shall vote to-day asI voted a year and a half ago, in favor of passing an employers'
liability act."
But whatever was the intention of Congress in the passage of
this Act, we are concerned only with the question: does the Actitself regulate interstate commerce within the broad meaning of
the Constitution? No matter what motive may have caused Con-
gress to pass the Act, that test must be satisfied. Giving to words
their accepted meaning, the forces of nature operating in their
ordinary way, it is impossible to find that the proposed legislation
will directly, naturally or logically promote or facilitate commercebetween the states. It is an Act "not directed against commerce
or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties and
liabilities of citizens and only indirectly and remotely affecting
the operations of commerce." 7
We are constrained to accept the language of the court in its
opinion in the recent case of Ho.rie v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R.
Co.,8 denying the constitutionality of this Act:
"Except so far as the Act is a regulation of commerce be-tween the states, its enactment was beyond the power of Congress;
7Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S., 104.873 AUt. Rep., 754 (Conn.).
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that it remotely affects such commerce is not sufficient if that re-
sult is only to be secured by invading the settled limits of the
sovereignty of the states with respect to their own interal
police."
However much we may welcome legislation which shall lessen
the burdens of the working classes, whether it be by employers'
liability acts or by workingmen's compensation acts, it will be
with regret if that end is to be accomplished by a strained and un-
natural construction of the powers of Congress under our existing
Constitution. There has been no attempt to discuss the other and
important features of this Act, but rather to confine the scope to
a single aspect. The final decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States upon this question, as well as upon the other ques-
tions that are involved in the construction of this statute will be
of the utmost importance in determining what powers under the
Constitution have been granted to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
John L. Hall.
